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COMMENT
COMPLEX FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION-
CAN JURY TRIALS BE CONSTITUTIONALLY AVOIDED?
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion affords the right to a jury trial to parties to a common
law action when the value in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars. In a select group of extremely lengthy cases in-
volving complex factual and legal issues, however, several
United States appellate and district courts have refused
to permit trial by jury. This comment reviews and evalu-
ates different theories that may be applied to preclude the
granting of a jury trial. In addition, guidelines are pro-
posed that may be utilized by a federal district court judge
in determining whether a case is so complex and lengthy
that a request for a jury trial should be denied.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 1970, an American producer of consumer electric
products filed a suit in a United States district court alleging anti-
trust violations against eight Japanese manufacturing companies
and nine subsidiaries.' Four years later, a second plaintiff filed
another suit naming, in addition to the same defendants, two
American companies and five Japanese subsidiaries. The two ac-
tions were joined. Almost 100 alleged co-conspirators, represent-
ing dozens of Japanese companies and international industrial
giants, were named in the consolidated action in which the plain-
tiffs claimed a world-wide conspiracy lasting over thirty years.2
Among the defendants' responses were counterclaims based on
three distinct theories.
3
1. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980).
2. Id at 893. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the following: (a) §§ 1 & 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976); (b) § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8
(1976); (c) the 1916 Revenue Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976) (a statute never construed in a
trial situation in its 64 year history); (d) the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1976); and (e) § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 893-94 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
3. The counterclaims involved the following: (1) counter-violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act and §§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) interference with competitors; and
(3) violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 894-95 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d
1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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By 1979, most of the pretrial discovery had been completed.
4
Over the nine-year period, 20 million documents were produced,
many of which had to be translated from Japanese. Pretrial con-
ferences consumed three days each month, deposition transcripts
numbered more than 100,000 pages, interrogatories came in
"wave after wave," and the pretrial memoranda totalled 410
pages.
The plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and the defendants
moved to strike the demand5 based on the contention that the case
was so complex that it was "beyond the practical abilities and lim-
itations of a jury."'6 On June 6, 1979, a federal district court judge
denied the defendants' motion.7 On interlocutory appeal, the court
of appeals reversed the district court, holding that a jury trial
should be denied when the jury is unable to understand the evi-
dence and issues and perform its task of rational decision making!
The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for
consideration of the degree of complexity of the case and whether
a jury was capable of rationally deciding the case.9 An adjudica-
tion on the merits, estimated to last one year,10 has yet to occur.
The recurrence of cases similar to the one described above'
forces the legal community to question the feasibility of juries in
complex civil litigation. 2 Of particular concern are the problems a
4. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 895 (E.D Pa.
1979), rev 'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980).
5. Id. at 892 n.1.
6. Id at 892. The defendants' proposed sample interrogatory illustrates the complexity
of the case. In reference to the conspiracy claims alone, the interrogatories to be sub-
mitted to the jury in reference to each of 24 defendants contained 23 subparts. In
reference to the entire action, the jury could be asked over 15,000 separate interroga-
tories for each relevant product market. Id& at 898.
7. Id. at 892.
8. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
9. Id at 1091.
10. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 897 (E.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980).
11. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Bern-
stein involved a class action in which there were 71 originally named plaintiffs and 16
defendants. Estimating the class of plaintiffs to be as large as 1,100, the plaintiffs
asserted that, because each class member had to prove his own injuries and damages
separately, over 1,000 mini-trials would be required. Id at 62.
12. Examples of cases considered to be too complex to be fairly adjudicated by a jury are
listed in the Chart, notes 290-309 and accompanying text infra. "Complexity" has
been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as follows:
A suit is too complex for a jury when circumstances render the jury unable
to decide in a proper manner. The law presumes that a jury will find facts
and reach a verdict by rational means. It does not contemplate scientific
precision but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a
fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and reasonable ap-
plication of the relevant legal rules.
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980).
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typical juror may encounter in absorbing and assimilating thou-
sands of documents and understanding intricate factual and legal
issues. In addition to these practical concerns, a jury trial may act
as an abridgement of the right to a fair trial and the guarantee of
due process."3 Therefore, if it is apparent that the trial will exceed
the jury's capability, a review of the scope of the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial' 4 becomes mandatory.
In Ross v. Bernhard,'5 the United States Supreme Court
noted that the capabilities of juries is one factor to be considered
in deciding whether the seventh amendment applies and a jury
trial should be allowed.' 6 The implications of the Ross opinion, spe-
cifically the importance of jury capability in deciding whether to
have a jury trial, is an issue "that strikes at the heart of this coun-
try's system of jurisprudence.' 7 Federal courts of appeals 8 and
district courts, 9 however, have dealt with this aspect of Ross in-
13. See notes 187-231 and accompanying text infra.
14. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
15. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
16. Id. at 538 n.10.
17. In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
18. Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980) (recognized that Ross limits the range of suits subject to the seventh amend-
ment but did not use Ross as its basis for holding that jury trials should not be per-
mitted in complex civil litigation) with In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation,
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (held that complex cases did not constitute an exception
to the seventh amendment right to a jury trial), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union
Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
19. The following United States district courts have applied Ross and have denied a jury
because the case was so complex: ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afrd sub nom. Memorex
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Polstorff
v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ala. 1977); In re United States Financial Sec. Liti-
gation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
The following district courts have applied Ross and have allowed a jury because
the case was not too complex for a jury to understand: Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v.
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Jones v. Orenstein, 73
F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
At least one United States district court has held that, despite the complexity of
the case, the Constitution allows a party the right to trial by jury. See In re IBM
Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal.), afrd sub
nom. Transamerican Computer Co. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d
646 (9th Cir. 1978).
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consistently, because the Supreme Court has yet to define Ross
and the limits of the seventh amendment more clearly. 2° In order
to alleviate disparate treatment by the federal courts, the
Supreme Court must specify the meaning of this factor of Ross
and give the courts manageable standards to follow in determin-
ing whether a jury trial is constitutionally required.
This comment evaluates the legal bases and policy considera-
tions for a flexible approach to the propriety of a trial by jury in
complex civil litigation. In addition, guidelines for application of
the Ross test to a limited number of complex, lengthy cases are
suggested.
II. MANDATE AND SCOPE OF THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Origin of the Seventh Amendment
The seventh amendment preserves the right to trial by jury
"in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars. '21 In accordance with a literal interpretation
of this mandate, the traditional view has been that unless a suit is
brought in equity, admiralty, or pursuant to certain federal
statutes, either party has the right to demand a trial by jury.23
The common law concept of a jury, which was embodied in the
Magna Carta, was that of a body of laymen selected either by lot
or by some other impartial and fair means.24 In both criminal and
civil proceedings, the jurors' duty was to make factual determina-
tions under the guidance of a judge.25 This delineation of the
jurors' responsibilities was preserved by the courts of England as
20. The Supreme Court recently refused to hear a case in which the effect of complexity
on the seventh amendment issue was raised. In re United States Financial Sec. Liti-
gation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nor. Gant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980). In addition, there has been at least one instance subsequent to Ross
when jury capability was argued in the lower court but not addressed when the case
reached the Supreme Court. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1118 (7th Cir. 1972),
affd sub nor. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See note 14 supra for entire text of the amendment.
22. In addition, jury trials are not required in the following proceedings: eminent domain
proceedings, United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1970); actions for civil
contempt, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); certain bankruptcy
proceedings, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-38 (1966); and actions to enforce
arbitration awards, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 373 F.2d
136, 142 (8th Cir.) (parties deemed to have waived right to jury trial), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 827 (1967).
23. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,
336-37 (1966); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937);
Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. 11 How.) 437, 459-60 (1850).
24. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1945); see Thayer, The Jury and Its
Development 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 254-55 (1892).
25. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
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an inherent part of the common law definition of a jury trial and
was subsequently incorporated into the seventh amendment to
the United States Constitution by the first Congress in 1791.26
Contrary to the prevailing notion that the original function of
a jury was solely to protect litigants from the decisions of a cor-
rupt judge27 the right to trial by jury was protected by the
framers for two other equally important reasons.28 First, the jury
trial was a proceeding devised to protect debtors from inflated
claims of British creditors29 and second, it was intended to frus-
trate legislators from passing new tax laws that would specifically
prohibit juries from adjudicating any tax protests. 0 The latter
two protections have become obsolete, leaving only the fear of a
corrupt judge as a valid reason for preserving the right to a jury
trial, as that right was envisioned by the framers. Today, in com-
plex civil litigation, another fear is arbitrary decision making by a
jury. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
noted, "A jury that cannot understand the evidence and legal
rules to be applied provides no reliable safeguard against errone-
ous decisions."31 Rigid adherence to the jury trial mandate in com-
plex civil cases therefore increases the likelihood for specious deci-
sion making.
B. The Scope of Equity Jurisdiction
In addition to noting the common law purposes of a jury, it is
important to ascertain the scope of equity jurisdiction because the
right to trial by jury is not constitutionally guaranteed in courts
of equity. 32 This rule originated in the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Massachusetts when Judge Story construed the
26. See Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendmen 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639, 725-26 (1.973) [hereinafter cited as Wolfram]. Little evidence can be
gleaned, however, from debates of the constitutional conventions as to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution. See Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil
Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 48 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Higginbotham].
27. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 708-10. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 562-63 (J.
Cooke ed. 1965) (A. Hamilton), which indicates that both federalists and anti-federal-
ists agreed that a jury trial was advisable for this reason.
28. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 670-71.
29. Id. at 673-705. See also Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928).
30. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 705-08. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 561 (J. Cooke
ed. 1965) (A. Hamilton), in which Hamilton discusses whether the absence of a jury
trial guarantee would enhance the possibility of oppressive taxation. He concludes
that a jury would be helpless to prevent unjust government taxation for several
reasons: a jury could have no influence over the legislature as to the amount of taxes;
taxes were usually levied in summary proceedings, which did not provide for juries;
and improper conduct by revenue officers was taken care of through criminal pro-
ceedings. Id.
31. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980).
The court also noted that if the jury is unable to function rationally and consistently
with the law, it could become an arbitrary and unpredictable decision maker. Id.
32. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
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seventh amendment right to extend only to those actions which
would have been heard in the common law courts of England in
1791. 31 This proposition was expanded by the Supreme Court in
Parsons v. Bedford:34 "By common law, [the framers] meant ...
not merely suits which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered .... - In accordance with Parsons, if a case,
because of its complexity, is deemed to involve equitable rights or
remedies, the seventh amendment right to trial by jury would not
apply.
The determination of whether certain actions fall within the
bounds of equity jurisdiction has evolved to the point where at
least three different tests are applied by federal courts: (1) the his-
torical test; (2) the adequacy of legal remedy test; and (3) the Ross
test. An evaluation of each of these tests and their relationship to
each other is essential to any seventh amendment inquiry.
1. The Historical Test
a. A Strict Approach
Under a strict historical test, all actions are triable before a
jury except those in equity, admiralty, or maritime, as those ac-
tions existed in 1791.36 Therefore, to ascertain what common law
actions fall within an equity court's jurisdiction, courts look to the
division between law and equity as it existed in England in 1791,
the year the seventh amendment was adopted.37 In addition to
classifying as equitable those common law actions which were
heard in English courts of equity in 1791, the historical test recog-
nizes that the right to trial by jury also may be granted or denied
in a federal statutory cause of action .3 And, if a federal statute
33. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
34. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
35. Id at 447. Accord, Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 449 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75
(1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970).
36. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union
Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
37. This proposition was first announced in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). Accord, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935);
In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied sub nor. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). But cf. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669
(1935) (seventh amendment construed to include common law of United States, not of
England). See also Wolfram, supra note 26, at 734.
38. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974); Duignan v. United States,
274 U.S. 195, 198 (1927); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d
1069, 1078 (3d Cir. 1980); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411,
422 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub norn. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980);
FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) ("The right of trial by jury ... as given by a statute of the United
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.").
1981]
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does not specifically indicate whether to allow a jury trial, courts
will look to the nearest historical analogy 39 to the statutory cause
of action to ascertain whether a jury trial should be allowed. 40
Although there is support for retaining the strict historical
test,4' there are inherent problems with this approach. First, the
reasons for confining the seventh amendment inquiry to the com-
mon law as it existed in England in 179142 are unclear. 4 3 More im-
39. If a case concerns only one claim and no counterclaims are asserted, the action should
be more readily deemed the same or analogous to one in existence in 1791. Liberal
joinder rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 20, allow one or more parties and several claims
and counterclaims to be joined in a single action, thereby making it more difficult to
analogize the entire case to one existing in 1791.
40. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (jury allowed in action for
repossession of real property brought under D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1501 to -1505
(1973), because right to repossess real property was recognized at common law); Cur-
tis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (seventh amendment right applies in action for
violation of the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601, 3604(a), 3612 (1976), because action was to enforce legal rights). See also 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2302, 2316 (1971);
James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as James].
41. Arguments in favor of the strict historical test include: "(1) its greater protection of
the jury trial right from inroads by active courts which would restrict the right; (2)
the curb it would put upon equally active courts bent on enlarging the scope of jury
trials; and (3) its greater certainty." James, supra note 40, at 664.
42. It is noteworthy, because of the seventh amendment's reliance on England's common
law, that jury trials are largely nonexistent in civil trials in England today, except in
suits alleging libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or fraud.
Ward v. James, [19651 1 All E.R. 563 (C.A.). In 1918, because of the manpower short-
age during the war, Parliament left the decision whether to grant a jury trial to the
court's discretion, except in six specified categories of cases and actions based on
fraud. See Juries Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 3, c. 23, § 1 (1918). The act was repealed seven
years later. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 3, c. 49, §
99(1)(h) (1925). Forty years later, in Ward v. James, [19651 1 All E.R. 563 (C.A.), trial
by judge was asserted to be the normal mode of trial.
The two reasons that have been given for the disuse of juries in England are its
gradual decline following World War I and the desirability of greater uniformity and
predictability in verdicts. Uniformity among the damage awards for a particular
class of injury is viewed as essential to justice, and it is believed that this uniformity
can be better accomplished by a judge. Zander, The Jury in England: Decline and
Fall?, in THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 32-33 (1977). For a more thorough develop-
ment of the decline of the jury system in England, see Delvin, Jury Trial of Complex
Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
43, 95 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Delvin]; Higginbotham, supra note 26,
at 52.
43. It has been noted that "[nio federal case decided after [United States v. Wonson, 28
F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750), see text accompanying note 33 supral
seems to have challenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges have
hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that would require Mr.
Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious." Wolfram, supra note 26, at 641, cited with
approval in In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 419 n.21 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). Professor
Wolfram discussed the debates prior to the adoption of the seventh amendment and
concluded that "it is hardly 'obvious' that a reference to the common law of England
at one particular point in time was the only satisfactory method of resolving the ad-
mitted differences in the jury trial practices in the states." Wolfram, supra note 26,
at 710.
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portantly, there was little correlation between the development of
separate causes of action in law and equity and the granting and
denying of trial by jury." As explained by one commentator:
At no time in history was the line dividing equity from
law altogether-or even largely-the product of a rational
choice between issues which were better suited to a court
or jury trial.... The procedure of each tribunal had to be
taken as a package, and each procedure had substantial
limitations which the other did not share .... "
Finally, the most compelling argument against the application of
the historical test is that it is temporally static.46 The test ignores
the Framer's intent to make the Constitution responsive to soci-
ety's future needs.47 As one federal district court judge explained,
the test requires the courts to read "twentieth-century meanings
into eighteenth-century terms. " 8 In recognition of these short-
comings, the strict historical test should be applied with caution.
b. A Flexible Approach
Criticism of the strict historical test has led some courts to
either reject it 4 9 or to use it only in conjunction with other tests.
50
44. James, supra note 40, at 661-62; Wolfram, supra note 26, at 731; see In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), in which the court
said,
If developments since 1791 have so changed the character of a suit at law to
make trial of particular suits to a jury unjust, then perhaps the historically
recognized boundary between law and equity should not govern the extent
of the seventh amendment right. If so, then deviations from this approach to
the seventh amendment should be based on the current policies and present
circumstances of the federal courts.
Id. at 1083.
45. James, supra note 40, at 661-62.
46. Professor Wolfram refers to this argument as "Itihe most objectionable feature of the
historical test." Wolfram, supra note 26, at 731.
47. The test has been described by one commentator as "hardly seem[ing] consistent
with the traditions of the principled constitutionalism that have guided the Supreme
Court in the interpretation of other commands of the Bill of Rights." Id
48. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,904-05 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (footnote omitted), rev 'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. E.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1078 (3d Cir.
1980) ("The Court has never relied on [a] static view of history to confine the seventh
amendment guarantee to causes of action recognized by the common law of 1791.").
50. E.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959).
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A flexible approach would look to factors other than solely
whether an action was classified as legal or equitable in England
in 1791. The Ninth Circuit, in In re United States Financial Securi-
ties Litigation,51 recognized such an approach, stating that "the
historical test is not static, rather it is more in the nature of an his-
torical inquiry, an inquiry which is guided by the statutory expan-
sion of legal rights, and the procedural developments which have
both expanded and retracted the role of the civil jury."52
A flexible approach is preferable to a strict approach to the
historical test because the common law rationales for classifying
an action as one at law or in equity have largely dissipated.53 Origi-
nally, rights and remedies were developed in courts of equity as an
attempt to alleviate injustices imposed by the rigidity of the writ
system in courts of law.54 Today, the merger of law and equity in
federal courts55 allows a single judge, sitting in a single courtroom,
51. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).
52. Id at 422-23. Professor Wolfram has labelled this the dynamic approach. Wolfram,
supra note 26, at 745. Three reasons have been given to support the position that the
framers of the seventh amendment intended to adopt a dynamic approach. First,
"common law" could have meant the common law of the states. Id at 734. Second,
"[w]hat is said to be preserved is not the institution of jury trial as it then existed (or
words to like effect), but rather the 'right' to jury trial." Id at 735 (footnote omitted).
Third, in 1791, "a commonly understood concept of 'common law' had become that of
a process characterized by occasional flexibility and capacity for growth in order to
respond to changing social pressures, rather than that of a fixed and immutable body
of unchanging rules." Id at 736 (footnote omitted). The author further notes that
"Iw]hat remains constant over the history of this process, however, is the tendency
toward expansion and enrichment of the remedies provided by the law courts." Id at
738 (footnote omitted).
53. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.3, at 34-45 (1973). Even in 1791 there was a significant
amount of overlap of remedies between the law and equity forums. James, supra note
40, at 658.
54. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.2 (1973).
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in
admiralty .... ); FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as
'civil action' ".). But see Kennedy v. Lasko Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1251 (3d Cir. 1969) (the
merger did not affect the distinction between law and equity for purposes of the
seventh amendment). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). Rule 38(a) "requires only that the
right 'as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a
statute ... shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.' " Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980).
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to apply any substantive rule and provide any appropriate
remedy, regardless of whether the rule or remedy originated in
equity or in law.56 The decision to grant either monetary relief or
specific performance, for example, is based upon the nature of the
claim itself and the particular needs of the parties." It is not based
solely upon whether, in 1791, the action would have been heard in
law or equity. Likewise, the right to trial by jury should not de-
pend solely on whether an action was heard in a court of equity or
law in 1791.
There is a second reason for abandoning the strict historical
test in favor of a flexible test. Until 1959,58 the common practice,
when the jurisdiction of law and equity was concurrent, was for
the forum in which the action was originally filed to retain juris-
diction of the entire case. 9 In other words, if the original pleading
in an action raised equitable issues, all issues in that action, both
legal and equitable, would be heard in an equity court without a
jury. This procedure also increased the likelihood that trial by
jury of legal issues could be lost by collateral estoppel if the case
were originally filed in a court of equity.6 ° Therefore, when related
legal and equitable claims were tried together, a jury trial was not
an option for the defendant if the plaintiff won the race to the
courthouse and filed a complaint in equity.61 The likelihood of a
race determining the seventh amendment right has now been di-
minished by the Supreme Court's decision in Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover.62 Beacon Theatres confirmed, in the wake of the
merger of law and equity in federal courts, that "only under the
most imperative circumstances ' 63 can trial by jury be abrogated
by prior adjudication of equitable claims.64 Owing to the nature of
modern procedure in federal courts, a flexible approach is essen-
tial to the viability of the historical test.
56. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
57. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959).
58. See icL at 509.
59. 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 179, at 251-52 (5th ed. 1941).
60. For a discussion of the equity court's practice of hearing all legal and equitable issues
presented, see Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1951).
61. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 909 (E.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). "[T]he merger of law and equity in the federal
courts casts considerable doubt on the survival of the plaintiff's historical ability to
choose a non-jury trial .... Id. at 907.
62. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
63. Id. at 510-11.
64. Id. Accord, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962).
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c. Application of the Historical Test in Complex Cases
Whether a strict or flexible approach to the historical test is
utilized, it can be deduced that complex and lengthy cases should
be heard in courts of equity without a jury. Because the historical
test's foundation is the classification of cases as legal or equitable
in England in 1791,65 the pertinent question to ask is whether, in
1791, some cases, because of their complexity, were heard before a
chancellor in an equity court rather than before a jury in a court of
law.
There is evidence that complex cases were heard in equity
rather than at law, especially if the action were for an accounting,
because accounts were written and members of a "jury of plough-
men" were unable to read the written accounts. 66 As early as 1887,
the United States Supreme Court held that, at least in cases where
an accounting is prayed for, complexity will suffice to render an
action equitable and to have a trial before a judge.6 7 More recently,
however, the Third and Ninth Circuits, while recognizing this as a
possible construction of the historical test, refused to cite early
cases from English courts of chancery as evidence that an equity
court could assume jurisdiction solely because a case was com-
plex.6 Similarly, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania concluded: "We... see no basis for find-
65. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
66. See, e.g., Clench v. Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ch. 1603) (action based on occurrences
sixty years before trial and only a court of chancery could adequately discern the rele-
vant deeds and accounts); cf. Wedderburn v. Pickering, 13 Ch. D. 767 (1879) (matter
of construing deeds and ascertaining title to be decided by chancellor).
67. Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887). The Court in Kirby stated:
The complicated nature of the accounts between the parties constitutes
itself a sufficient ground for going into equity. It would have been difficult, if
not impossible, for a jury to unravel the numerous transactions involved in
the settlements between the parties.... Justice could not be done except by
employing the methods of investigation peculiar to courts of equity.
Id at 134. In Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831), the Court noted, "[G]reat
complexity ought to exist in the accounts, or some difficulty at law should interpose,
some discovery should be required, in order to induce a court of chancery to exercise
jurisdiction." Id at 503. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). It
has been contended that equity took cognizance of complex actions only if they were
for an accounting. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp.
889, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). Many complex casesheard by
equity courts were accounting actions because lawyers labelled their suits as such to
ensure equity jurisdiction. Delvin, supra note 42, at 72.
68. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1083 3d Cir. 1980); In
re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 423 n.39 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied sub nor. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). Although there is no longer
a division between courts at law and courts in equity in the federal judicial system,
for purposes of the seventh amendment, this distinction remains. Throughout this
article, "equity courts" is used to represent the forum in the federal court system in
which jury trial is not allowed.
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ing in the complex accounting cases a rationale, policy, or 'implicit
belief' that complex and difficult questions of fact, whether of lia-
bility or of damages, must be decided by judges rather than
juries." 69
Even if such reliance on early equity cases in England is dis-
favored, it must still be remembered that equity courts were com-
mitted to combating the rigidity of the legal system by providing
flexible approaches to the solution of controversies and by devel-
oping procedural and substantive rules in response to either inade-
quate or unduly strict legal doctrines. 70 In light of this basic func-
tion of equity courts,7 1 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York72 recognized that the "traditional
equity powers of the Court certainly include the power to strike a
jury demand when to allow it to stand would work an injustice.
73
Based on their traditional powers, equity courts under a
merged system should likewise take cognizance of those cases so
complex that a jury is incapable of rational decision making.74
This argument was rejected, 75 however, by the Third Circuit in In
re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation.76 The court
noted that no federal courts "have looked to the chancellor's con-
cern for justice and his perception of the common-law jury of 1791
in order to conclude that he would have decided a matter outside
of the categories of suits specifically recognized as within that jur-
isdiction. ' 77 Similarly, at least one legal scholar has argued that
the flexible approach favors trial by jury in complex cases be-
69. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 921 (E.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd on other grounds sub non. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
70. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.1, at 24 (1973). In this respect, it has been observed that
equity courts have an "inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each
succeeding generation and age." 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 67, at 89 (5th ed. 1941).
71. Equity courts have not always been viewed favorably. Two commentators equate the
development of equity with "one of the greatest legal accidents of all times." G.
CALABRESI & P. BOBBI'r, TRAGIC CHOICES 41 (1978). The authors likely feel the "legal
system" could have been more responsive to the needs of the people by not requiring
strict conformity to the writ system.
72. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
73. Id. at 66 (emphasis added). Contra, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
74. For a complete analysis of how history may support this contention, see Delvin,
supra note 42, at 65-77. Delvin concluded that "it is unquestionable that by 1791 ac-
counts were being taken in equity simply because they were complicated." Id. at 68.
Moreover, he found support for the contention that complex cases generally were
heard before the chancellor. Id. at 72-77.
75. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The
court described this argument as "a deduction of the likely reaction of an English
chancellor to a hypothetical complex suit filed at law in 1791." Id at 1083.
76. 631 F.2d 1069'(3d Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 1083.
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cause, without the public scrutiny afforded by the jury, justice
may be "lost in the maze."78 It seems more likely, however, that
justice will be "lost in the maze" if the jurors cannot understand
the issues and evidence and are thus precluded from reaching a ra-
tional verdict.
One inherent problem with the flexible approach to the histor-
ical test is the possibility of a large margin of error in its applica-
tion. Even though it could be inferred that equity courts took cog-
nizance of some cases because of their complexity, it is impossible
to determine what factors triggered the courts' determinations
that the complex nature of the case required trial by the court in-
stead of by a jury.79 The historical approach must be examined in
any seventh amendment inquiry, but one must apply it with cau-
tion and recognize that it is the practice of equity courts to hear
cases in which the legal remedy is inadequate.8 0
2. The Adequacy of Legal Remedy Test
In addition to the historical test, courts have looked to the
adequacy of legal remedy before deciding if a case should be heard
in equity. For example, courts at law cannot grant specific per-
formance or injunctions and, therefore, such actions must be
78. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 747. Wolfram stated:
The dynamic approach to the seventh amendment would... reject the no-
tion that the guarantee of jury trial should be determined by reference to
matters of trial convenience or the relative "difficulty" of the legal or factual
issues in the case. To the contrary, the alleged difficulty of issues in a case
might argue more strongly than otherwise for the intervention of a jury, for
this would permit some form of public scrutiny of the proceedings in order to
assure that the "justice" of the case is not permitted to be lost in the maze.
Id. at 746-47.
79. As one commentator noted, the factors utilized in deciding whether to have a trial
before a jury in 1791 may be quite different from the factors considered today:
The real change, which makes comparison impossible, is perhaps the change
in the relationship between trial by jury and trial by judge alone as it was in
1791 and as it is today. Today in England the non-jury trial has, to the regret
of some, triumphed in civil litigation because it is quicker, more economical,
and more predictable than the jury trial. The latter is now thought of as
something to be used when more than money, e.g., reputation, is at stake; it
has become a more elaborate form of trial, deluxe, tailormade; the ordinary
litigant, it is felt, should be content with the standard model.
In 1791 it was just the reverse. It was the non-jury trial in Chancery that
was thought of as elaborate and long drawn out. "Speed and simplicity"
were what Hamilton claimed for the jury in 1787.
Delvin, supra note 42, at 106 (footnotes omitted).
80. "The adequacy of legal remedy test is not a test of jurisdiction; it is a test of the jury
trial right." D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.7, at 82 (1973).
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heard in equity courts because the legal remedy, that is damages,
is inadequate." The legal remedy is also inadequate if an ex-
tremely complex case is tried before a jury incapable of compre-
hending the issues.
The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that inade-
quacy of legal remedy is a "viable prerequisite" to equity jurisdic-
tion.82 Such jurisdiction, however, is not confined to those cases in
which the requested remedy at law, usually monetary damages, is
inadequate to redress the wrong.83 Instead, the pertinent question
is whether a court of law is able to respond to an alleged wrong. 4
The Supreme Court has succinctly stated that "jurisdiction in
equity attaches unless the legal remedy, both in respect to the
final relief and the mode of obtaining i; is as efficient as the
remedy which equity would confer under the same circum-
stances."85 If the mode of obtaining a remedy is by jury trial, and
the jury cannot understand the issues and reach a verdict based
on the evidence, the remedy provided by a court at law is inade-
quate.
Traditionalists argue that classification of an otherwise
"legal" action as an equitable action solely because of its complex-
ity does violence to the basic purpose of the seventh amendment. 86
An early Supreme Court case, United States v. Bitter Root Devel-
opment Co.,8 7 is an example of the Court's refusal to consider the
81. Id. § 2.5, at 57-65. Accord, 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 33 (Boston 1836). As Story noted:
Perhaps the most general, if not the most precise, description of a Court of
Equity, in the English and American sense, is, that it has jurisdiction in
cases of rights recognized and protected by the municipal jurisprudence,
where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the Courts of
Common Law.
Id. at 32.
82. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
83. The procedure as well as the relief available must be adequate. Kilbourn v.
Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1889). Kilbourn involved an action brought in a
court of equity for breach of fiduciary duty. An objection to equity jurisdiction, made
after the answer and counterclaim and based on adequacy of legal remedy, was
denied. Id. at 514.
84. 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 51, at 65-67 (5th ed. 1941).
Moreover, "the sufficiency and completeness of the legal remedy must be certain; if it
is doubtful, equity may take cognizance." Id. § 176, at 241 (footnote omitted).
85. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1889) (emphasis added). See also
Delvin, supra note 42, at 54, where the author states that a plaintiff had a right to
discovery in a court of equity if the necessary proof was unavailable in a court of law.
86. See Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914) (action for fraud and misrepre-
sentation concerning patent is legal not equitable). The Court in Curriden held that
the "mere complication of facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity
jurisdiction." Id. Accord, Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.) (order strik-
ing a jury demand vacated in patent infringement case), cert denied, 404 U.S. 852
(1971). The Tights, Inc. court noted that "[tlo the extent that resolution of ... issues
entails determinations of fact, either party is entitled to demand trial by jury." Id.
at 338.
87. 200 U.S. 451 (1906).
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legal remedy inadequate solely on the basis of complexity. Even
though the case involved numerous conspiracies and the conver-
sion of millions of feet of timber, the defendant's contention that
the facts were so complex that the case should be tried before a
judge was rejected.8 8 The Court stated that "[tlhe principle ground
upon which it is claimed that the remedy at law is inadequate is
really nothing more than a difficulty in proving the case against
the defendants.' ' s Complication of facts alone is therefore insuffi-
cient to render the legal remedy inadequate and deny a party his
right to a trial by jury. Complex facts, however, combined with a
large volume of evidence, a lengthy trial, and complex legal issues
can limit a juror's comprehension of the issues and should be con-
sidered in a determination of the adequacy of the legal remedy and
the availability of a jury trial under the seventh amendment.
Moreover, a growing number of courts" and commentators 91
assert that when a case is so complex that it precludes fair, ra-
tional adjudication by the jury, the due process clause operates to
preclude a jury trial.
In discussing legal and equitable relief, the United States
Supreme Court has not directly addressed complexity 92 of the liti-
gation, as opposed to complication of facts alone, as a factor in de-
termining adequacy of legal remedy. In fact, the Supreme Court
has recognized that federal courts, due to the merger of law and
equity, are more able to provide adequate remedies today than
federal courts of law could in the past.9 3 For example, the Supreme
Court, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,9 4 found adequacy of
legal remedy to be a "practical term" and, as such, to "be deter-
mined, not by precedents decided under discarded procedures, but
in the light of the remedies now made available by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Federal Rules." 95
88. Id. at 472. Cf. Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914) (complication of facts
alone was insufficient to warrant equity jurisdiction after a finding that the facts of
the case were not complicated). See also Delvin, supra note 42.
89. 200 U.S. 451, 472 (1906).
90. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980).
91. E.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199 (1976). "If, in the course of events, a traditional mode of trial makes it
impossible for a case to be comprehended and the law understandingly applied, due
process requires that that mode be replaced." Id. at 208. Accord, Kane, Civil Jury
Tria" The Case For Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L. REV. 1 (1976); Rifkind, Are
We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96 (1976).
92. See note 12 supra.
93. As the Court noted in Beacon Theatres, "Since in the federal courts equity has always
acted only when legal remedies were inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal
remedies provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules neces-
sarily affects the scope of equity." 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (footnote omitted).
94. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
95. Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
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Beacon Theatres involved claims of antitrust violations and
unfair competition. Issues common to the plaintiff's equitable
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and the defen-
dant's legal counterclaim and cross-claim existed.16 The Supreme
Court held that the dispute, in light of the merger of law and
equity, should be settled before a jury in one suit at law because
the underlying nature of the issues presented was legal. 97 In con-
firming the preference for jury trials, the Court recommended
that only inadequate legal remedy or irreparable harm could jus-
tify collateral estoppel of legal issues and the attendant right to
trial by jury by prior adjudication of equitable claims.9 8 The Bea-
con Theatres Court cautioned, however, that the seventh amend-
ment right may be expanded only to the extent permitted by the
Federal Rules of Procedure. Simultaneously, a litigant's "substan-
tive rights" 99 must be retained and a "fair and orderly adjudica-
tion of the controversy" 00 must be guaranteed. When a jury is in-
capable of rational decision making due to the complexity of
issues presented to it, these safeguards have been impaired be-
cause first, a party's due process rights have been violated, and
second, he has been denied a fair trial.
The seventh amendment issue presented in Beacon Theatres
was before the Supreme Court three years later in Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood. 101 In that case, the plaintiff brought an action for an
accounting of monies due under its contract with the defendant
and for an injunction to prevent further dealings under the con-
tract, because continued dealings by an unauthorized dealer con-
stituted patent and trademark infringement.0 The Court held
that, despite the use in the pleadings of the terms "accounting"
and "injunction," the action was actually one for debt or damages
and was therefore legal.'0 3 The Court set forth the following stan-
dard to determine whether an action is equitable or legal:
The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit
for an equitable accounting, like all other equitable reme-
dies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon Theatres, the absence
of an adequate remedy at law. Consequently, in order to
maintain such a suit on a cause of action cognizable at
96. Id at 503-04.
97. Id at 504. The Court stated: "It follows that if [the defendant] would have been
entitled to a jury trial in a treble damage suit against [the plaintiff] it cannot be
deprived of that right merely because [the plaintiff] took advantage of the avail-
ability of declaratory relief to sue [the defendant] first." Id
98. Id
99. Id at 508-09. A violation of due process is an example of an infringement of "sub-
stantive rights." See notes 255-59 and accompanying text infra
100. 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959).
101. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
102. Id. at 474.
103. Id. at 477-78.
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law, as this one is, the plaintiff must be able to show that
the "accounts between the parties" are of such a "compli-




Applying this standard to the facts in Dairy Queen, the Court con-
cluded that "[a] jury, under proper instructions from the court,
could readily determine the recovery, if any, to be had here,
whether the theory finally settled upon is that of breach of con-
tract, that of trademark infringement, or any combination of the
two."
105
It is apparent that the Supreme Court is eroding the tradi-
tional distinction between law and equity for the purpose of grant-
ing or denying trial by jury.106 Supreme Court cases indicate that
the Court prefers to classify an action as one at law and thereby
preserve trial by jury10 7 if it can do so within the bounds of the
Federal Rules.' °0 The Court's approach to the seventh amend-
ment, however, leaves open the possibility that complexity could
be considered in deciding whether the legal remedy is inadequate
and the case should be heard in a federal court without a jury.10 9 In
104. Id at 478 (footnotes omitted).
105. Id at 479.
106. The Supreme Court, in several cases in addition to Dairy Queen, considered and re-
jected the traditional differences between law and equity when faced with the
seventh amendment issue. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974)
(defendant's demand for trial by jury was allowed in a landlord's suit brought under a
District of Columbia statute to recover possession of real property, because the right
of recovery was established and protected at common law); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974) (suit for violation of fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, although not an action at common law in 1791, was essentially legal in nature
and, therefore, the right to trial by jury attached); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970) (jury demand by plaintiff granted in shareholder's derivative action because,
although the shareholder's right to sue originated in equity, the right to trial by jury
attached to those issues that would have been heard at law in a suit brought by the
corporation).
107. E.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
108. The Court retreated from this position to some extent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Parklane Hosiery was a stockholders' class action suit
alleging issuance of a materially false proxy statement. Before the action came to
trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued the plaintiffs in Parklane in an
administrative proceeding on essentially the same charges. Id at 324. The plaintiffs
in Parklane moved for partial summary judgment based on the ruling at the admin-
istrative proceeding. Id at 325. This use of offensive collateral estoppel was upheld
by the Supreme Court. Id at 335. Although the defendant's right to trial by jury on
the issues decided at the administrative hearing was thus denied, the Court main-
tained that the defendant, who had vigorously defended at the hearing before the
Commission, was deprived of no procedural opportunities. The Court stated that
"the presence or absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike, for
example, the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum." Id. at
332 n.19. This decision is perhaps indicative of the Court's desire to minimize the role
of the jury, at least in appeals from administrative decisions.
109. Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962) (Court discussed com-
plicated nature of accounts as a rationale for equity jurisdiction and found that ac-
counts in case before it could be understood by the jury).
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Beacon Theatres, it was held that "only under the most impera-
tive circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determi-
nation of equitable claims."11 ° In the twenty years since Beacon
Theatres was decided, "imperative circumstances" have emerged,
as evidenced by complex cases. 1 ' Such circumstances were likely
not anticipated because the adequacy of legal remedy, in light of
the jury's inability to understand issues presented to them, was
not at issue in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen.
The jury's role in civil litigation is "to assure a fair and equita-
ble resolution of the factual issues,""' 2 based on "common sense,
common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on evidence."II
The jurors must be able to understand the evidence and then, by
deductive reasoning, be able to sift through conflicting facts and
reach reasonable conclusions concerning a sequence of events."4
Clearly, adequacy .of remedy is lacking when jurors are unable to
perform their function as fact finders because of their inability to
understand the complex issues presented.
3. The Ross Test
a. Analysis of the Ross Test
Recognizing that equity courts hear cases either for historical
reasons or because the remedy at law is inadequate, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity in Ross v. Bernhard' 5 to propose, in a
footnote, a viable test that combines both an historical analysis
and the adequacy of legal remedy. The Ross test can be used to
distinguish legal and equitable issues when dealing with the right
to trial by jury. Initially, one must look to the "nature of the issues
to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.""16 The
110. 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (footnotes omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide certain procedural devices to help jurors understand complex cases. For ex-
ample, rule 53(b) allows special masters to help jurors understand the evidence. How-
ever, "[elven this limited inroad upon the right to trial by jury 'should seldom be
made, and if at all only when unusual circumstances exist.' " Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 n.18 (1962) (quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S.
249, 258 (1957)).
111. It has been concluded that "[t]he rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen is itself
'an equitable doctrine'. . . , and the traditional equity powers of the Court certainly
include the power to strike a jury demand when to allow it to stand would work an in-
justice." Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59,66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966)).
112. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973).
113. Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956).
114. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972); see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 907 (1979).
115. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
116. Id at 538 (footnotes omitted). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 496, 473
n.8 (1962).
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nature of the issue is determined by considering a three-prong
test: first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries.
117
Ross was a shareholder's derivative action for conversion of
corporate assets, breach of contract, gross breach of fiduciary
duty, and gross negligence.l"s The Supreme Court in Ross held
that
[tihe heart of the action is the corporate claim. If it repre-
sents a legal issue, one entitling the corporation to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury is
not forfeited merely because the stockholder's right to
sue must first be adjudicated as an equitable issue triable
to the court.'19
As in Beacon Theatres120 and Dairy Queen,'2' the Ross Court did
not address whether the issues were too complex for the jury to
understand. Unlike Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, however,
in Ross the parties argued the issue of complexity on appeal. 22
The Ross test has been applied in decisions concerning the
right to a jury trial by several federal courts of appeals 23 and dis-
trict courts. 24 The Ross opinion, however, is not the final word
concerning the seventh amendment right. The Supreme Court has
demonstrated, in cases both before and after Ross, a general reluc-
tance to deny jury trial demands.125 One federal district court
judge has characterized the right to a jury trial, where it exists, as
117. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
118. Id. at 531-32.
119. id. at 539. In other words, "the right tojury trialattaches to those issues in derivative
actions as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have
been entitled to a jury." Id. at 532-33.
120. 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see text accompanying notes 94-100 supra,
121. 369 U.S. 469 (1962); see text accompanying notes 101-05 supra.
122. See Brief for Petitioner at 18-20, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Brief for
Respondent at 17-20, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), the court
stated: "The omission of any discussion of the jury's ability to deal with the complex
issues presented in Ross implies strongly that the Court did not deem it relevant to
the Seventh Amendment issue there." I& at 927-28. A preferable analysis is that the
Court did not have to decide the issue.
123. See note 18 supr.
124. See note 19 supra.
125. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (statutory action for recovery
of real property); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (action brought under Civil
Rights Act of 1968); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (action for an ac-
counting based on trademark infringement and breach of contract); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (action for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tion in anticipation of defendant's suit under the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
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"so central to our system of jurisprudence that abrogation of that
right must be regarded as an extreme measure of last resort.'
' 26
The Ross Court, nonetheless, was aware that complex litigation
could be a catalyst for jury incompetence, and the Court made a
long overdue clarification that, in such cases, jury incompetence is




The first prong of the Ross test, the pre-merger custom, is in-
herently troublesome because it is unclear what custom the Court
was referring to. The historical test requires a review of the com-
mon law in England in 1791,128 rather than a random searching
through state and federal practices prior to the merger of law and
equity in federal courts as the name implies.129 If this latter type of
review were the Court's intent, the pre-merger custom prong could
be viewed as a partial abandonment of the strict historical test
and an incorporation of the flexible historical inquiry.
30
The second prong of the Ross test, the remedy sought, has ac-
quired new significance in light of the status of law and equity in
federal courts.13' Courts of law have gradually increased their
exercise of jurisdiction over actions and remedies that originally
developed in courts of equity. 32 Few remedies, therefore, may still
be classified as purely equitable. 33 One commentator has con-
126. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Bernstein
court eventually denied the jury demand, citing Ross and finding the antitrust action
to be beyond the practical abilities and limitations of the jurors.
127. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The three-prong test inRoss is introduced by the clause
"as our cases indicate." Id, It is likely therefore that the Supreme Court in Ross was
only clarifying a previously expounded concept. On the other hand, the clause has
been labeled as vague and unsupported. In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation,
609 F.2d 411,425 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nor. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S.
929 (1980).
128. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
129. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 643. The author explained that the pre-merger reference
may be a recognition of the effect of Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres on the
historical test. For example, these two cases indicate that the merger of law and
equity allows a party the right to trial by jury in cases where the right did not exist in
1791. If this is the intent of the Supreme Court, this historical test "might be subject
to substantial modification in future cases." Id.
130. Id. at 739-45.
131. Remedies once available only in courts of equity are now available before a merged
forum in federal courts. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.6 (1973).
132. Id at 73.
133. Only one United States court of appeals has denied a jury trial based largely on the
second prong. Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974). The Hyde
court held that the remedy for fraudulent conveyance of promissory notes, setting
aside the transfer, is equitable. Id at 306. Hyde involved an interpleader action in
which the federal government claimed arrearages in the defendant corporation's tax
payments. Id at 304. These payments were allegedly avoided by a fraudulent convey-
ance of promissory notes by the defendant corporation in exchange for an outside
corporation's release of all interest in its property. In addition to the second prong,
the court also utilized the third prong, but to a lesser degree. Id at 306. It found
"that a jury is not especially well-qualified to dispose of such issues and that a non-
jury trial of the issues is both more efficient and more likely to produce a just result."
Id
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cluded that equitable remedies are still available in only two situa-
tions: (a) where the action is "too complex for a jury so that the
legal remedy is inadequate, or (b) where an in personam order is re-
quired, as with an injunction, or specific performance." '134
The third prong of the Ross test clearly asserts that "the prac-
tical abilities and limitations of juries" are necessary considera-
tions in ascertaining the legal or equitable nature of a claim. 135 The
impact of the third prong, however, has caused considerable de-
bate in the courts. Four United States district courts have denied
jury trial demands based solely on this prong.1 36 One of these
courts asserted that the Ross test is of "constitutional dimen-
sions, ' 137 and another labeled it as a "restatement of the Court's
traditional equity powers. 1 38 The importance placed on the third
prong of the Ross test by these district courts, however, has not
been adopted by any of the federal courts of appeals. 139 The con-
troversy may be illustrated by comparing the district court's and
court of appeals' decisions in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. 140 The district court stated:
We next examined the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions in order to determine whether questions of jury
competence had been elevated to constitutional stature
by the mention in Ross v. Bernhard of "the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries." We determined that to so
read the Ross dictum would be inconsistent with the in-
tentions of the Supreme Court, with settled principles of
jurisprudence, and with the very policies expressed in the
Seventh Amendment itself.'14
134. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.6, at 78 (1973).
135. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
136. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (jury demand
denied in suit alleging conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolization); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (jury trial denied in action brought for monopolization of the com-
puter industry), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (D.C. Cal. 1977) (jury demand denied in complex securities
antitrust litigation), rev 'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nor. Gant v.
Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99
(W.D. Wash. 1976) (jury trial denied in securities fraud action).
137. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976). The
court held the Ross test to be a limitation to or an interpretation of the seventh
amendment. Id.
138. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
139. Cf. Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that the issues
were complex and likely to confuse the jury and that a judge would be more efficient
and just, the court denied a jury trial based on the second and third prongs of the
Ross test combined).
140. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 942.
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Conversely, on appeal the Third Circuit,142 holding that a jury trial
would violate due process,1 43 stated that "at the very least, the
Court has left open the possibility that the 'practical abilities and
limitation of juries' may limit the range of suits subject to the
seventh amendment and has read its prior seventh amendment de-
cisions as not precluding such a ruling.' ' 44 This diversity of opin-
ion among the courts mandates clarification of the third prong by
the Supreme Court.
Although the Court has never commented on the weight to be
assigned each of the prongs, it can be argued that any one prong is
sufficient to classify an action as equitable. Thus, if an analysis of
the first two prongs suggests that an issue is legal, the court must
nonetheless decide whether, given the practical limitations of
juries, a jury adequately can perform its function of deciding a
particular issue.145 If not, then the claim should be equitable in na-
ture. Furthermore, in order to preserve a litigant's due process
rights, 146 this prong must be given added weight.
It is apparent that there is some overlap between the second
and third prongs. In complex civil litigation, when the jurors are
unable to understand the issues presented or unravel the evi-
dence, the legal remedy is inadequate147 and the second prong of
the Ross test, as well as the third, suggest an "equitable" classifi-
cation. As explained in Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., "
[Wihere the "remedy sought" necessarily involves deter-
rmination of complexities that "only a court of equity can
satisfactorily unravel" the "practical abilities and limita-
tions of juries" are also necessarily involved and must be
considered in evaluating the right to a jury trial. The ade-
quacy of the legal remedy necessarily involves the ade-
quacy of the jury and its competence to find the facts.1
49
142. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
143. See text accompanying notes 244-49 infra
144. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3d Cir. 1980).
The court also said that the "inclusion [of the third prong] in the three prong test
strongly suggests that jury trial might not be guaranteed in extraordinarily complex
cases ...." Id at 1079.
145. Id; see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV.
898, 911 (1979). The Court's three-prong test recognizes factors to consider and does
not require that each prong lead to the same conclusion in reference to a law/equity
classification. Meeting the third prong alone is sufficient to classify an action as
equitable. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). Additionally, Polstorff v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Ala. 1977)
stands for the proposition that no jury trial is permitted unless all three prongs of the
Ross test are met. Moreover, the court in Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) stated, after granting a jury trial, that the 900,000 marked documents submit-
ted in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976), alone
were sufficient to weigh against a jury trial. 73 F.R.D. at 606.
146. See text accompanying notes 208-29 infra.
147. See notes 109-14 and accompanying text supra.
148. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
149. Id. at 66.
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By construing the second and third prongs together, it may be dis-
cerned that the jurors' ability to understand a claim and make
findings of fact is the basis of the Ross test.
b. Criticism of the Ross Test
The Ross test has not been universally accepted and, in fact,
has been much criticized. For example, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania'50 asserted that the
Ross test should not be viewed as establishing a new constitu-
tional standard,15' noting that such an important step would not
have been relegated to a footnote. 152 In addition, the Supreme
Court failed both to give authority in support of the test 53 and to
explain or mention the test in subsequent seventh amendment
cases. 15 4 Finally, it has been noted that the test's purpose cannot
be fulfilled because judges are not necessarily more capable than
jurors of deciding complex issues."5
Critics of the Ross test fail to acknowledge that the three-
prong test probably was placed in a footnote because of the
Supreme Court's deference to the district court's finding that the
150. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 942. The court, however, did concede that
in no decision of which we are aware has a court reached the conclusion that
we reach here - that the Ross footnote may not be read as requiring or per-
mitting the consideration of "the practical abilities and limitations of juries"
in determining whether the constitutional right to trial by jury extends to
matters committed by Congress or the common law to federal district
courts.
Id. at 926. Three reasons were given for the court's conclusion that the practical abil-
ities and limitations of juries cannot limit the seventh amendment right:
(1) the available evidence shows that the Supreme Court never intended that
the Ross footnote be a "test" for Seventh Amendment questions; (2) the pro-
posed "test" is unworkable; and (3) application of the Ross "test" in the
manner proposed would be fundamentally inconsistent with the policies
underlying the role of the jury in civil actions in the United States.
Id
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nor. Memorex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
154. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575 (1978); Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
155. Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974); see G. CALABRESI & P.
BOBBi'rr, TRAGIC CHOICES 140-42 (1978). It has been stated that "apart from the
occasional situation in which a judge possesses unique training .... the assumption
that a jury collectively has less ability to comprehend complex material than does a
single judge is an unjustified conclusion." Higginbotham, supra note 26, at 53.
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issues in the case were not too complicated for the jury to compre-
hend. 5 6 In addition, the Supreme Court cases involving the
seventh amendment and decided subsequent to Ross were not
conducive to utilization of the Ross test because the issues in-
volved were not deemed so complex that the jury could not func-
tion adequately. 57
It would be difficult for a court to define precisely either
"complexity" or "practical abilities and limitations of juries." The
determination that a case will be incomprehensible to a jury so
that equity jurisdiction will be invoked pursuant to the Ross test
is not an easy one to make.1 5 The district court judge is in the best
position to make this determination and guidelines must be estab-
lished to facilitate his decision making.'59 Factors such as com-
plexity of facts and length of trial can be utilized to determine if a
case is complex and are either well-known or predictable with a
fair degree of accuracy. The definition of complexity must be devel-
oped and tested by the judiciary as well as the legislature. The
Ross test is only the beginning of a long-overdue clarification of
whether a case is equitable or legal for seventh amendment pur-
poses.
C. The Fair Cross Section Requirement
If the action is deemed to be one at law and there is a right to
trial by jury, an examination of jury competence must still be
made. The United States Supreme Court has outlined the two re-
quirements of a competent jury for both civi 160 and criminal 61 pro-
156. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 403
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). This argument
was rejected by the district court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 914-15 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The issue of complexity,
however, can best be ascertained at the district court level, and it is preferable for ap-
pellate courts to defer to that judgment.
157. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (no issue of complexity in
case holding that use of offensive collateral estoppel, based on prior suit heard in a
court of equity, did not infringe on seventh amendment right to trial by jury);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (no issue of complexity in case holding that leg-
islature's determination of right to trial by jury should not be abridged); Atlas Roof-
ing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442(1977) (com-
plexity not involved and seventh amendment right was granted in accordance with
legislative mandate); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (the Court made
no mention of complexity, but looked to pre-merger custom and remedy sought in
granting jury trial); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (the Court allowed a jury
trial after looking to the remedy requested, complexity not being at issue).
158. For a discussion of the pros and cons of a case-by-case determination, see Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 931-34 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980).
159. See Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 611, 637 (1979). But see James, supra note 40, at 690-93.
160. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
161. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
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ceedings: impartiality and representation by a fair cross section
of the community. 62 Undoubtedly, it is difficult for these criteria
to be met in jury trials that involve complex issues and that are
expected to last several months. 63 The impartiality of a jury is dif-
ficult to gauge in any case, whether or not complex. On the other
hand, the fair cross section requirement can be used accurately to
judge jury competence in complex civil litigation.
The fair cross section rule requires a method of jury selection
that eliminates prejudice and arbitrary decision making.164 It was
originally developed to protect criminal defendants from being
tried by a jury that was unrepresentative of the community at
large. 165 This rule, now codified in the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968,166 concerns the jury selection procedures in both civil
and criminal trials.
162. Any argument that a "blue ribbon" jury (one consisting of a panel of individuals with
above average intelligence) can better adjudicate complex issues than a jury drawn
from average citizens, thereby being a means of preserving the right to a jury trial, is
inconsistent with the fair cross section requirement outlined by the Supreme Court.
This is true even if a blue ribbon jury were capable of rendering a rational verdict.
Moreover, the sole use of professionals would inhibit citizen participation in govern-
ment, which takes place through the jury, because a limited number of people would
be suitable. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 65-66 (1978). But see
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (state statute allowing blue ribbon juries, which
was later repealed, held not to be unconstitutional on its face). Although the Fay
Court upheld the statute, it stressed that this might not be the case if a federal
statute were involved, because the seventh amendment right to a jury trial was not
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, whereas it did apply in
federal trials. Id at 283.
163. See Kane, Civil Jury TriaL The Case For Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L. REV.
1 (1976); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Tria4 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1961). Both
authors criticize a strict interpretation of the application of the seventh amendment,
even though it might be technically justified. See also McCoid, Procedural Reform
and the Right to Jury TriaL" A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
164. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976). This statute was
enacted to ensure that the venire represents a "fair cross section of the community."
165. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 296 (1930). In Taylor v. Louisiana, the fair cross section rule was found by
the Supreme Court to be "fundamental to the American system of justice." 419 U.S.
at 530. Although Taylor was a criminal case involving the sixth amendment jury trial
right, there is no reason why this fundamental rule should not also apply to civil liti-
gation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia has
ruled that the fair cross section rule, being a fundamental right, is applicable in civil
proceedings. Simmons v. Jones, 317 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D. Ga. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973). In Simmons, all civil and criminal prosecutions
against the defendant were enjoined until violations of the fair cross section rule,
such as over-representation of retired persons and public employees, were corrected.
The court noted that a violation could occur from inclusion, as well as from exclusion,
of designated groups from the jury panel. Id at 404 (citing Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 287 (1950)). The court's concern was that parties in civil and criminal litiga-
tion be assured of the opportunity and the right to strike jurors from a panel drawn
from a jury pool as provided by FED. R. Civ. P. 47 and 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1976).
166. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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Although the original pool, the total number of eligible jurors
in the community, is intended to represent a fair cross section of
the population, when potential jurors are informed that a trial may
last several months, many must be excused because of the per-
sonal hardship a long trial would cause.167 Although the Jury Se-
lection and Service Act was amended in 1978 by the Jury System
Improvements Act to limit hardship excuses, 16 it remains possi-
ble for a significant number of potential veniremen to be removed
from the representative group simply because the length of trial
precludes their service. 169 Those individuals least likely to raise
hardship excuses because of the length of the trial will be retired
and unemployed persons. 170 Moreover, the jurors most likely to be
excused will be those with demanding business, family, or profes-
sional obligations.' 7 1 When a significant number of the potential
jurors are excused, the remaining jury panel may no longer be a
representative sample of the community at large. Although a
party is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition or to
one that is representative of all segments of the population,172 de-
167. See notes 274-76 and accompanying text infra.
168. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(b), 1866(c) (Supp. III 1979) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(b), 1866(c)
(1976)).
169. Id §§ 1866(c), 1869(j). Although § 1866(c) was amended to eliminate distance of travel
as an excuse for not serving, it still allows a potential juror to be excused by the court
"upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience." These terms, as used
in 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (Supp. III 1979), are defined by the Act to mean
[g]reat distance, either in miles or traveltime, from the place of holding court,
grave illness in the family or any other emergency which outweighs in im-
mediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, or
any other factor which the court determines to constitute an undue hardship
or to create an extreme inconvenience to the juror.
Id § 1869(j) (emphasis added). Thus, the court retains the discretion to excuse a juror
due to the length of a trial.
170. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
171. See C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 77-80 (1962). The author surveyed judges
and jurors and found that most juries are not composed of a fair cross section of the
community. For instance, one researcher found that women and housewives are over-
represented (approximately 63%) while the employed, including white collar and self-
employed individuals, are under-represented (approximately 8%). A large portion of
the remaining pool (approximately 27%) were retired persons. Id at 196. In addition,
48% of the jurors were found to be in the 40-59 age group, 31% in the 21-39 age
group, and 21% in the 60-70 age group. Id at 198. An occupational grouping of
jurors revealed that 41% were housewives, 13% were clerical workers, 10% were
craftsmen, 9% were retired, 7% were executives, and 7% were professionals. Id. at
200.
172. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208
(1965) (peremptory challenges to exclude veniremen solely on basis of race is not
unconstitutional); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 270 (1947) (party entitled to a fair
trial but jury need not be of any particular composition). Accord, United States v.
Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1977); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161,
164 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948).
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pletion of the pool due to hardship can amount to a fair cross sec-
tion violation if identifiable groups are systematically excluded. " 3
Peremptory strikes"" may also increase the likelihood of a fair
cross section violation in complex cases. A party may use each of
his three peremptory challenges to exclude jury members for any
reason. ' It is unlikely that these strikes alone would result in the
exclusion of all individuals who represent a distinct segment of
the population. When a significant number of people have already
been excused due to hardship, however, peremptory strikes could
eliminate an ascertainable group that had already been virtually
eliminated from the panel due to hardship excuses.
7 6
The likelihood of a fair cross section violation was discussed in
In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 177 a 1976 decision of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton. Boise involved five consolidated securities fraud actions and
was the first case in which a federal court denied a jury demand
solely because of the anticipated complexity and length of the
trial.7 8 More than 900,000 documents were expected to be intro-
duced at trial, and the anticipated trial length was four to six
months.179 In denying a jury trial demand, the Boise court noted
that neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the United
States Code mandated a jury in that particular situation.8 0 The
court found that, because of the length of the trial, it would be im-
173. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423, 446-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub norm Memorex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
174. A peremptory strike gives a party the right to challenge without assigning a reason
for the challenge. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1976). See also id § 1866(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979); FED. R. Civ. P. 47.
176. This problem can become more serious when multiple parties are involved. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (1976), the court has discretion to allow additional peremptory
challenges for multiple parties or to consider the litigants as a single party for the
purpose of peremptory challenges. Additionally, when actions are consolidated for
trial and multiple parties result on one or both sides of the action, each party is
entitled to three challenges. It is not difficult to imagine the large numbers of panel
members who could be eliminated by these challenges in extremely complex litiga-
tion. For example, in Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), there were 11 defendants and 65 plaintiffs and, therefore, 228 potential jurors
could have been eliminated solely by peremptory challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 1870
(1976).
177. 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
178. Cf Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974) (jury trial denied for com-
bined reasons of complexity and equity jurisdiction); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (same).
179. 420 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
180. Id. at 105.
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possible for the composition of a jury to be a collection of impar-
tial minds from diverse backgrounds.181
Two years later, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp.
v. International Business Machines Corp., 182 discussed the fair
cross section rule in a trial that was expected to be unusually
lengthy. The plaintiff alleged monopolization or attempted mo-
nopolization of markets in the computer industry. 1s3 Because the
trial was expected to last ten months, a special panel of 175 pro-
spective jurors was called. Only 29 prospective jurors remained
after all other jurors had presented legitimate hardship excuses.
After declaring a mistrial because the jury was deadlocked, the
court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and
denied the plaintiff's jury trial demand in the event of a retrial.
The ILC court stated that "[tjhe 11 jurors to whom this case was
submitted probably represented a random cross section of people
in the community who could afford to spend 10 months serving on
a jury, but it is open to question whether they were a true cross-
section of the community. '1s4 This violation of the fair cross sec-
tion rule was a significant factor in the ILC court's denial of the
plaintiff's jury demand in the event that the case was remanded
on appeal for retrial. 185
Both Boise and ILC illustrate the courts' awareness of the
possibility of disparate and improper jury composition in com-
plex, lengthy civil litigation. When systematic exclusion of certain
classes from a jury occurs because of the pragmatic limitations
imposed by a lengthy trial, the fundamental precept of fair repre-
sentation is defeated. Because the seventh amendment has been
interpreted to require a jury representing a fair cross section of
181. Id This decision was reached with "the necessity for the appearance and the fact of
fairness" as the paramount concern, and the court held that a judge would be
superior to a jury because a jury lacked procedural tools used by a judge to manage,
organize, and review large amounts of evidentiary materials. Id The court cited Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1970), and the Ross test, see text accompanying
notes 115-49 supra, in support of its decision.
182. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
183. Id at 448.
184. Id (emphasis added).
185. Id at 446-47. The decision to strike a jury trial demand in the event of a remand for
retrial was also based on the court's finding that the case was so complex that it must
be placed within the scope of equity, thereby defeating a jury demand. Id at 444-46.
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the community, such exclusion is not constitutionally permissi-
ble.1
86
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to examining the mandate and scope of the
seventh amendment, the requirements of the fifth amendment
must be considered when deciding whether a complex case should
be tried before a jury. Both procedural and substantive aspects of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment require a fair trial
before a fair tribunal. When a case is unusually complex and
lengthy, a jury may be incapable of fairly reaching a verdict based
on the facts at issue.
A. Procedural Due Process
One of the guarantees of the fifth amendment is that no per-
son may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due proc-
ess of law.s 7 The concept of procedural due process, declared by
the Supreme Court to be synonymous with fairness, ensures that
the parties are guaranteed a fair trial by a fair tribunal.188 More-
over, the Court has said that a fair trial cannot exist when arbi-
trary18 9 or irrational verdicts are rendered by the finder of fact.190
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recognized in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion,'9' a jury performs two important functions in the legal sys-
tem in rendering a fair and just verdict. The first is "black box"
186. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 936 n.83 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d
1069 (3d Cir. 1980). In Zenith, the district court refused to strike a jury trial demand
on the basis of the fair cross section issue, noting: "It may well be that . . . 'undue
hardship or extreme inconvenience' . . . will persuade the court to excuse many
business executives and professionals, but this certainly does not mean that the
defendants will be forced to submit their case to a jury selected from society's incom-
petents and misfits." Id. Even though the court's refusal to strike a jury trial in
Zenith would not necessarily result in a pool composed solely of "incompetents and
misfits." the absence of educated individuals and vrofessionals would be a clear viola-
tion of the fair cross section rule. The Third Circuit's reversal of the district court's
decision in Zenith lends support to this contention. The Third Circuit noted: "The
long time periods required for most complex cases are especially disabling for a jury.
... The prospect of a long trial can also weed out many veniremen whose professional
background qualifies them for deciding a complex case but also prohibits them from
lengthy jury service." 631 F.2d at 1086.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
188. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (jury trial in juvenile proceedings
not mandated by Constitution); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
189. Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956).
190. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); cf United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (irrational legislation is violative of due process).
191. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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decision making, which entitles a jury to render a verdict unac-
companied by any explanation. 192 Because the basis of decisions
remains secret, a jury can shade or modify harsh points of law
whereas a judge is forced to apply the same law rigidly. 193 Sec-
ondly, in a case where line drawing is necessary, such as the deter-
mination of whether degrees of certain conduct constitute negli-
gence, a group of community members lend more credence to a de-
cision than does a single judge. The Third Circuit concluded, how-
ever, that these functions cannot be performed by a jury that can
neither apply the law to the facts nor understand the evidence or
the issues because of the complexity of the case.1 94 In such a situa-
tion, the parties may be deprived of a fair resolution of the issues
involved if a jury trial is permitted. Some federal courts have rec-
ognized that due process requires a reversal when cases include
such voluminous evidence that a jury could not have rationally as-
similated the material presented.19
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has indicated
that the basic purposes of a fair trial are to ascertain the truth, to
administer justice,196 and to "minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions. '1 97 In light of the potential infringement of these due proc-
ess rights, the traditional seventh amendment jury trial proce-
dures should be altered in complex litigation because the jury no
longer provides a reliable safeguard against erroneous deci-
sions. 198
B. Substantive Due Process
The fifth amendment guarantee of substantive due process re-
quires that the law not be administered in an unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious fashion.' s9 This guarantee could be violated by
the verdict of a jury faced with a large volume of evidence and
192. Id. at 1085.
193. Id. The court calls this process "jury equity," which allows a jury to modify the law
to conform to community values.
194. Id.
195. See Citron v. Aro Corp., 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.) (action for damages, accounting for
profits, and an injunction alleging conversion of trade secrets and counterclaim
based on trade libel; 11-day intermission affected party's substantive rights; implicit
in ruling was the fact that due process guarantees a comprehending fact finder), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967); Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954)
(consolidated condemnation proceedings brought by United States to condemn large
number of tracts of land; owners of 236 tracts were represented by 12 attorneys, and
evidence took seven weeks to present). Accord, United States v. Central Supply
Ass'n, 6 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Ohio 1947) (defendants indicted for conspiracy to violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act; 217 defendants were named and court granted
judgments of acquittal because case was unmanageable by a single court).
196. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
197. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
198. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
199. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525
(1934).
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faced with complex multi-issue cases, such as those involving pat-
ent or trademark infringement. 00 Justice Black, in In re Mur-
chison, 2 01 declared any unfairness inherent in the fact finder's ver-
dict to be a violation of a basic endeavor of our system of law.20 2
The due process clause was the basis of the denial of a jury
trial in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation. 
2 03
Therein the court emphasized the presumption that a jury will de-
cide issues rationally, based upon a "fair and reasonable assess-
ment of the evidence and a fair and reasonable application of rele-
vant legal rules. '20 4 Finding that the complexities of the legal and
factual issues 205 would prevent a jury from performing its deci-
sion-making task rationally, the court held that, in the interest of
"evenhanded justice, '20 6 due process precluded a trial by jury.207
C. Federal District Court Decisions
In at least five instances, United States district courts have
agreed that complex and lengthy litigation must be heard before a
judge in order to protect due process rights.20 8 In Bernstein v. Uni-
versal Pictures, Inc.,2 °9 a class action was brought by 65 lyricists
and composers, representing 400 to 900 other musicians. 210 Alleg-
ing infringement of copyrights, restraint of trade, illegal monopo-
lization, and violation of antitrust laws, the suit involved more than
1,000 contracts against eleven defendants. District Court Judge
Brieant issued a show cause order with respect to the plaintiffs'
jury demand and subsequently decided that a jury would be un-
able to comprehend the case and to decide the issues rationally.
211
200. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
201. 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (case addressed situation in which same judge sat as "judge-
grand jury" before which witnesses testified and presided at contempt hearings for
same witnesses).
202. Id. at 136.
203. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
204. Id. at 1084.
205. See notes 1-10 and accompanying text supra.
206. 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980).
207. Id. at 1085.,
208. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 636
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation,
75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). All of these courts utilized the
Supreme Court's three-prong test outlined in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538
n.10 (1970), in deciding that a jury trial was not proper.
209. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court dismissed the original action finding
that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and
on appeal the case was remanded for improper dismissal. Id. at 60.
210. Id at 62.
211. Id at 70.
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The court stated: "[T]o hold that a jury trial is required in this
case would be to hold that the Seventh Amendment gives a single
party at its choice the right to an irrational verdict. ' 12 Further-
more, Judge Brieant noted that Bernstein was the "exceptional
case" and "any role that a Special Master might be able to play in
[a jury trial] is so peripheral that the underlying complexities will
necessarily remain."' Although the court conceded that more is
involved in the function of a jury than rational competence, 214 the
decision to deny the jury trial was based upon the overriding due
process consideration.215
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California addressed the fifth amendment's conflict with the
seventh amendment in a thorough opinion, ILC Peripherals Leas-
ing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.21 6 The case in-
volved a 96 day trial, 87 witnesses, and 2,300 exhibits.2 17 After a
mistrial was declared because the jury was unable to reach a ver-
dict after 19 days of deliberations, a retrial was ordered. The de-
fendant's motion to strike the jury demand was granted because
the judge observed that at the first trial2 8 the jury was having
trouble grasping the concepts discussed by the expert wit-
nesses. 219 The foreman confirmed the judge's observations, re-
marking that this type of case should not be tried before a jury:
"If you can find a jury that's both a computer technician, a
lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you
could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about
that. "220
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington in In re Boise Cascade Securities Litiga-
tion22' held, based partially on the due process requirements of the
fifth amendment, that a non-jury trial was required.2 2 The court
212. Id at 71.
213. Id at 70; see FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (allows the court to appoint a special master to assist
the fact finder by presenting the factual issues in a simplified form). See also note 268
and accompanying text infra.
214. 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see text accompanying notes 191-94 supra. See also
Note, The Right to a NonJury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1961).
215. 79 F.R.D. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
216. 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
217. Id. at 444.
218. Judge Conti had denied a pretrial motion to strike the plaintiff's jury demand at the
first trial on the ground of complexity. Id.
219. Id. at 447.
220. Id
221. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). For a discussion of the case with respect to the
fair cross section rule, see notes 177-81 and accompanying text supra.
222. 420 F. Supp. 99. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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stated that an impartial, capable fact finder is central to a fair
resolution of a civil action."' The court further noted that the fair
cross section rule, as applied to the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial, is encompassed in the notion of due process. This is be-
cause the fair cross section rule is intended to preserve a jury com-
posed of impartial minds from diverse backgrounds. The Boise
court noted that the jury was not a qualified fact finder because
the inherent complexities of the case rendered the jury unable to
decide facts fairly. 24 In addition, the court stated that
at some point, it must be recognized that the complexity
of a case may exceed the ability of a jury to decide the
facts in an informed and capable manner; at this point, no
verdict is within the meaning of due process as envisioned
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
225
In In re United States Financial Securities Litigation,226 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia applied a flexible approach to the seventh amendment to
avoid a clash with the fifth amendment. This class action suit was
brought for alleged violations of federal securities laws. 227 More
than five million documents and 150,000 pages of depositions
were produced in discovery and at least an additional 100,000
pages of other documentary evidence were anticipated. Denying a
jury trial, the court reasoned that the demands of the trial, ex-
pected to last two years, were beyond the practical limitations of
any juror who would be asked to serve.228 The court found that a
judge would be a more appropriate finder of fact because he would
have procedural tools at his disposal that were unavailable to a
jury, such as the right to interrupt the trial and to question wit-
nesses.229
As these United States district court cases illustrate, some
cases are so complex that a fair trial can only be had before a
judge. On the other hand, an analysis of the seventh amendment
leads to the conclusion that a jury trial is required in actions at
law. In a complex case where the underlying nature of the issues is
legal, the mandates of the fifth and seventh amendments clash. If
223. Id The court emphasized that the fifth and fourteenth amendments measure the
legitimacy of government action in terms of fairness.
224. Id
225. Id
226. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied sub
nom Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
227. Id at 706. Eighteen cases were consolidated and five classes certified. Id at 705.
228. Id at 714.
229. Id at 713.
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the Supreme Court does not classify such lengthy, complex cases
as equitable, it may not be able to maintain its policy of avoiding
constitutional issues whenever possible 230 and may be forced to
balance the fifth and seventh amendments.
231
IV. BALANCING THE FIFTH AND
SEVENTH AMENDMENTS
Whenever possible, all of the amendments to the Constitution
are to be construed together,212 and no one amendment is
favored. 3 3 If a conflict between two amendments occurs, however,
it must be resolved by balancing the competing rights protected
by the respective amendments. 214 Since the adoption of the
seventh amendment, several procedural devices have been used to
usurp the jury's function. It has never been maintained, however,
that a litigant's right to a fair trial as required by the fifth amend-
ment can be infringed upon procedurally or substantively. It can
be inferred, therefore, that if an irreconcilable clash between the
two amendments occurs, the fifth amendment should be
favored.
235
230. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972) ("[W]e follow our usual custom
of avoiding decision of constitutional issues unnecessary to the decision of the case
before us."); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 576
(1947) ("To [clarify the ambiguity of the pleadings] would be directly contrary to the
policy of avoiding constitutional decisions until the issues are presented with clarity,
precision and certainty.").
231. If the Court refuses to grant certiorari in a case involving fifth and seventh amend-
ment issues, other possibilities remain for obtaining a Court decision. First, a con-
stitutional amendment could be adopted in which certain classes of cases, such as
trademark violations, patent infringements, or antitrust claims, must be adjudicated
solely before the Court. Alternatively, Congress could pass a statute removing the
right of trial by jury in the above-mentioned classes of cases, as has been done with
other statutory causes of action. If either of these two approaches is adopted, the
Supreme Court eventually would be forced to determine the constitutionality of these
measures. If the jury issue were clarified, the lower federal courts would be provided
with long-overdue jury guidelines in complex civil litigation. It is difficult to predict
when the Supreme Court will make such a move, in light of its reluctance to do so in
the past.
232. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930). See also Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540 (1888).
233. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907).
234. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 433 U.S. 368, 391-98 (1979) (conflict between first
and sixth amendments); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976)
(same). The Supreme Court in Nebraska Press emphasized that even where balancing
is necessary, the resulting priority is only applicable to the particular case under con-
sideration:
But if the authors of these guarantees [The Bill of Rights], fully aware of the
potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the
issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the
Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do. It is unnecessary,
after nearly two centuries, to establish a priority applicable in all cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 562.
235. See Harris & Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REv. 611, 624 (1979).
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A. The Erosion of the Seventh Amendment
Although the Supreme Court has traditionally held that the
right to a jury trial in civil litigation is a basic right to be jealously
guarded,2 36 the Court has also held that "exceptional cases" and
"specified causes" can constitute sufficient grounds for erosion of
the seventh amendment guarantee.2 37 The complex, lengthy cases
described in this comment satisfy the "exceptional" requirement
and nullify the purposes behind the seventh amendment.
Even if the seventh amendment is viewed as a substantive
right, it has been subjected to several procedural limitations. The
Constitution allows courts to impose restrictions on the right to
trial by jury as evidenced by the alteration of the common law role
of a jury for both practical reasons and to preserve one's due proc-
ess rights. The Supreme Court, in Galloway v. United States,23
recognized that the jury's role could be circumvented without vio-
lating the seventh amendment by employing directed verdicts2 39
and motions for a new trial.2 40 The Court deemed these procedural
devices to be constitutional because, when the seventh amend-
ment was adopted, the procedure governing trials varied greatly
among the common law jurisdictions.2 41 The Supreme Court has
also held that there is no constitutional bar to a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, a procedural device that infringes upon
the function of a jury by allowing a judge to overrule the jury's
verdict.242 These procedural tools, which negate a jury's tradi-
tional function as fact finder, are available to a judge faced with
the possibility of an unjust or unnecessary verdict. The judge
should also have the discretion to deny a jury trial in cases where
the facts are so complex that a jury is incapable of rationally
rendering a verdict.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that the use of directed verdicts and judg-
236. See Lyon v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 305 U.S. 484, 492 (1939);
Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882); Webster v Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437,
459 (1850).
237. Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 373, 375 (1872). Winegar does not define
these phrases. For examples of federal district court cases that are "exceptional," see
note 208 and accompanying text supra and Chart, notes 290-309 and accompanying
text infra. However, none of the cases included mentioned Winegar as support for
denying a jury trial.
238. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
239. Id. at 390-92; see FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a); 9 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2522, at 539 (1971).
240. 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943); see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
241. 319 U.S. 372, 389-92. See generally Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fic-
tions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954); Henderson, The Background of the Seuenth
Amendmen 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).
242. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967); accord, Manaia v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 11
Complex Federal Civil Litigation
ments notwithstanding the verdict is sufficient to protect liti-
gants in complex cases from irrational jury verdicts.243 This argu-
ment was labeled fallacious when the case was appealed to the
Third Circuit. 44 In addition, the Third Circuit stated that these
procedural devices do not protect all elements of due process, such
as the need to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions 24 and the
demand that the verdict rest solely on the legal rules and evidence
adduced at trial. 46 The court pointed out that these devices per-
mit a court to enter a verdict against any party who has failed to
submit a minimum amount of evidence that would allow a jury to
find in its favor. However, the court noted that although a jury
verdict that satisfies this standard is rational in one sense, an irra-
tional verdict can still exist under specific elements of due process
in extremely complex cases.247 Pointing out that a directed verdict
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted where a
possible jury verdict is only minimally supported by the evidence,
the court stated that due process requires the elimination of the
risk of error, hence the giving of some "fair assurance that the
jury's findings of fact and applications of legal rules are reasona-
bly correct. '248 Consequently, when a jury can comprehend
neither the legal issues nor the evidence, there is no measure of as-
surance of a correct decision based on the evidence, as required by
due process. 249 Thus, a judge should be empowered to deny a jury
trial altogether where irrational verdicts are likely.
B. Composition and Decisions of Juries
The common law concept of a jury composed of twelve mem-
bers was altered by the Supreme Court in Patton v. United
States,2 10 a criminal case in which the defendant waived his right
to twelve jurors and the trial proceeded with eleven jurors. On ap-
peal, the defendant contended error. The Court stated that in the
eighteenth century a defendant could not waive the right to trial
by jury because there was fear of a judge's corrupt judgment of in-
flicting the severe punishment of forfeitures of official titles and
powers upon conviction.2 51 Noting that the original justification
243. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 937-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d
1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
244. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980).
245. Id. at 1087 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), where the Court
held that administrative procedures were sufficient to minimize risk of error).
246. 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).
247. 631 F.2d 1069, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 1088.
249. Id.
250. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
251. Id, at 296.
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for the rule no longer existed, the Court held that a defendant
could waive his right to a jury of twelve and proceed before fewer
jurors or before the court.252 Because the Constitution allows the
composition of the jury to be altered and the decision of the jury
to be less than unanimous, 253 further changes could also be made
in light of difficulties presented by complex, lengthy civil litiga-
tion. Such changes are necessary in order to preserve the viability
of the Constitution, which is dependent on its adaptability to situ-
ations that may not have been foreseen at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted.254 One such change could be total elimination of
the jury when the jury is presented with a complex, lengthy case.
C. The Overriding Concerns of the Fifth Amendment
Even if the seventh amendment trial by jury is regarded as a
fundamental right,2 55 it is arguable that there should be no right to
a jury if the jury is incapable of fairly deciding a case. The due
process right to a competent and impartial tribunal must be
separated from the right to any particular form of proceeding. Due
process is an inherent right in all proceedings, whether before a
judge,256 an administrator, 257 or a jury. The seventh amendment,
252. Id. at 307-09. Accord, FED. R. Civ. P. 48. Cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)
(six-member jury did not violate the seventh amendment). But cf Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-person jury in a criminal trial was inadequate). The Court
went even further in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), holding that a guilty
verdict in a state criminal case rendered by less than a unanimous vote of the jurors
did not violate the defendant's right to trial by jury. Id. at 406. The opinion indicated
that unanimity is still required by the sixth amendment in federal prosecution.
A jury trial is more jealously guarded for criminal defendants than it is for civil
litigants, as evidenced by the fact that the sixth amendment, and not the seventh
amendment, has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
253. See note 252 supra.
254. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 559-60 (1965) (Warren, J., concurring). See also In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980),
where the court stated: "In lawsuits of this complexity, the interests protected by
this procedural rule of due process carry greater weight than the interests served by
the constitutional guarantee of jury trial." Id.
255. Some might argue that further support for the superiority of the fifth amendment is
evidenced by the fact that the seventh amendment is not deemed a fundamental right
incorporated'into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and applied to the
states, as is the fifth amendment. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 541-42 (9th ed.
1975). It is possible that the seventh amendment has been subject to various pro-
cedural limitations, such as directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the ver-
dict, and fewer than twelve jurors, because it is not a "principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937); accord, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see Harris & Liber-
man, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 611,
624 (1979). On the other hand, others may note that incorporation of the seventh
amendment into the fourteenth amendment is unnecessary because most state con-
stitutions provide for a trial by jury in civil cases. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 23.
256. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
257. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970).
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however, does not extend to administrative hearings2 5 or actions
in equity.25s The conclusion must be that, although there is always
a right to due process in the adjudication of a claim, one party can-
not request a jury trial and thereby subject the other party to an
unfair trial. This situation could arise if a jury heard a case that is
both complex and lengthy.
Several federal courts faced with the competing constitutional
claims have granted a jury trial in instances when one of the par-
ties raised the issue of complexity. 2 ° These decisions have been
based upon a rigid application of the seventh amendment, despite
opposing due process arguments. Most of these cases, however,
may be distinguished from complex cases in which a court has
denied a jury trial because they do not satisfy both of the require-
ments necessary to activate the fifth amendment's overriding
power: extraordinary length and complexity.61
In Jones v. Orenstein, 262 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York considered only the length of
the trial in allowing a jury trial. Jones was a class action involving
securities fraud. The court compared Jones to In re Boise Cascade
Securities Litigation263 and found that Jones involved an esti-
mated trial length of six to eight weeks, whereas Boise involved a
projected four to six month trial.264 Moreover, the Jones court
noted that the 900,000 documents submitted in the Boise case
were sufficient in themselves to weigh against a jury trial. Con-
versely, in Jones there was no indication that certain judicial
tools, such as access to daily transcripts or admissions of deposi-
tions into evidence, would make the court a more effective trier of
fact than the jury. 265 It is an illusion of justice to afford the oppor-
tunity to present evidence and argument only before an uncom-
258. McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1862).
259. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
260. E.g., Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441
F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
261. See notes 208-29 and accompanying text supra.
262. 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
263. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
264. 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
265. Id Similarly, in Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224
(N.D. Ill. 1977), the court used Boise Cascade as a comparison. The court noted that
Boise's financial records spanned five years and involved more than a billion dollars.
Id at 228. In Radial Lip, only a small number of documents were offered into
evidence, only two corporations were named as parties, and the validity of the
patents involved was undisputed. Additionally, the Radial Lip trial was anticipated
to last three weeks, in comparison to Boise Cascade's four to six month duration. Id
See also Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert denied 404 U.S. 852
(1971), in which a jury trial was granted because the court found that the patent for
pantyhose under dispute "d[id] not present the opaque technicalities which might
cause a jury particular difficulty. It involve[d] no abstract scientific theories, no in-
tricate mechanical devices, no complex chemical compounds." Id at 342.
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prehending body. Therefore, if there is no constitutional right to a
non-jury trial,266 there should be a court-created right when the
fifth amendment so requires.267 Cases such as Jones illustrate that
either length or complexity alone are insufficient to negate the ap-
plication of the seventh amendment. If a case is both complex and
lengthy, the fundamental fifth amendment right to a fair trial
must override the seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to constitutional considerations, the practical con-
cerns in complex, lengthy cases render a trial before the court
more appropriate. 268 For instance, while a jury trial in complex
civil litigation can be prohibitively expensive, 26 9 a trial before a
judge can be more efficient 270 and therefore less burdensome to the
266. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
267. As Alexander Hamilton observed: "I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern
the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury in
civil cases .... The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to depend on
circumstances foreign to the preservation of liberty." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at
561-62 (J. Cooke ed. 1965) (A. Hamilton).
268. Pro-jury commentators argue that the problems of jury adjudication of complex civil
litigation can be alleviated by using special masters, allowing a jury to take notes
during trial, or allowing a jury to retire with exhibits and transcripts. In re United
States Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 428 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). But see Note, The Right to a Jury
Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 908 & n.60 (1979 (citing
Record at 19,490-91, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). One
juror's understanding of the facts in ILC can be seen from the court's interrogation
of the juror:
The Court: And what is - do you know what an interface is? [An inter-
face is the connection between a computer and an auxiliary piece of equip-
ment.]
Juror [D]: Well, if you take a blivet, turn it off one thing and drop it
down, it's an interface change; right?
Id. at 908 n.60.
269. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (cost of jury was $32,000; despite efforts made by judge and
jury at trial, court declared a mistrial), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see Center for Jury
Studies Newsletter, No. 2-2 (Mar. 1980), stating that all persons on jury duty at all
jurisdictional levels cost $750 million in wages alone in 1979. But see G. CALABRESI &
P. BOBBIIIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 73 (1978) ("A comparison of the cost of the jury system
and the three-judge system (necessitating three times as many judges as there are at
present) . . . would show that the jury's expense is not greater and may be in fact
substantially less.").
270. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 1069, 1087 (3d Cir.
1980), in which the court pointed out the advantages of a judge: greater ability to
allocate time to deciding a complex case; colloquies with expert witnesses; and
capability to reopen trial to clarify or obtain additional evidence pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(a).
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judicial system.27' Unlike a jury, the judge has more control over
the presentation of a case because he can interrupt the trial to
question witnesses, call recess to review documents, dictate the
order in which evidence is presented, reach a decision without the
time constraints imposed on a jury, and utilize law clerks to re-
search fine points. 272 Finally, a mistrial can impose particular
problems if a case is heard before a jury. Because a jury does not
submit findings of fact with its verdict, a retrial of the entire case
will be necessary.272
Complex civil litigation can also present problems for indi-
vidual jurors. In complex litigation, many educated or employed
jurors are excused during voir dire due to hardship or employment
demands.2 74 "Few employers would tolerate such a period of ab-
sence; few careers would not be materially and permanently re-
tarded in terms of promotions, seniority, maintenance of profes-
sional proficiency, etc., by such a long absence. ' '271 In addition,
lengthy, complex trials would probably increase the number of
271. See Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1059 n.12 (1964) (on
the average, bench trials in civil cases were 40% less time-consuming than cases tried
before a jury).
272. E.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
The court in Boise noted:
In addition to the Court's experience in presiding over other complicated
cases involving commercial matters, the Court has available to it tools that
are unwieldy in the possession of a jury. Among these tools are review of
daily transcripts; admission of depositions into evidence instead of reading
relevant portions aloud; review of selected portions of testimony from the
reporter's notes and flexibility in scheduling trial activities. In addition, the
Court is able to study exhibits in depth and carry on colloquies with
witnesses, expert and non-expert alike, in an orderly and systematic manner.
Of course, this is in addition to the Court's knowledge of the litigation
resulting from its review of the record since the cases were filed.
I
273. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub non. Memorex Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.
Fed. 690, 697 (1974).
274. E.g., In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713-14 (S.D. Cal.
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank,
446 U.S. 929 (1980). In commenting upon the unreasonable demands placed upon a
juror in a complex case, the court stated:
Any experienced trial judge knows that there is an enormous difference
between asking an average citizen to sit for a few days or even for a few
weeks on a jury, on the one hand, and asking the same citizen to sit for two
years on the other hand. It would be unconscionable to demand of any gain-
fully employed person - even a civil servant, who normally will be excused
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jurors excused during the trial.276 The severe psychological bur-
dens imposed upon the jurors by a lengthy, factually complex case
affect the willingness of jurors to reach a verdict rationally. Frus-
tration, due to the jurors' inability to understand the issues,2 77 evi-
dence, and testimony, as well as boredom with a seemingly end-
less parade of experts undoubtedly alter their unbiased perception
of the proceedings.278
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide aids to the jury.
For example, rule 53(b) allows special masters to assimilate the
issues and explain them to the jury. Also, rule 49 allows the court
to submit special interrogatories to the jury to determine the ex-
tent of the jury's understanding of the issues. Pretrial formulation
and simplification of issues is allowed pursuant to rule 16. These
rules are limited in their effectiveness, however, one court noting
that with extremely complex cases, "[A]ny role that a Special
276. See The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 485 (1960). While alter-
nates may help alleviate this problem, rule 47(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure sets the maximum number of alternates at six and gives the court discretion
to allow fewer or no alternates. Even if the maximum number of alternates is pro-
vided, the length of a trial could still force all six alternates to serve and perhaps fur-
ther reduce the original number of jurors. See, e.g., In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 708 (S.D. Cal 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (1979), cert denied
sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), in which the court discussed a
case similar to Financial Securities in which three months after trial began, two of the
four alternates allowed by the court had to be excused because of the length of the
trial. Fearing similar depletion of the jury members in Financial Securities, the court
was persuaded to deny a jury trial. Id.
277. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir.
1980).
278. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California made the
following statement, which illustrates the burden placed upon jurors in extremely
complex cases:
The fact finder will not only have to read, but will have to comprehend,
the contents of these thousands of documents. It will have to analyze the
USF accounts and the accounts of many subsidiaries, not only as they exist,
but as the plaintiffs contend they should have existed. It will have to listen
to, understand, and remember - throughout the trial - months upon
months of highly technical and often boring testimony about various
aspects of the USF accounts, including the testimony of the various expert
witnesses who inevitably will be called by many of the parties to give their
theories of whether the accounting standards actually used were correct,
and, if not, what the correct standards should have been. After receiving and
evaluating all of the evidence, the fact finder will then have to apply this
mass of information to all of the asserted causes of action, each of which is
based on different laws and different standards. The finder of fact must con-
sider, separately, the evidence pertaining to each of the 100 or so defendants
so as to reach a correct decision as to each. Finally, the fact finder will have
to figure out which of the 100 or so defendants are liable to which of the
plaintiffs, and which of those defendants are consequently liable to which of
the other defendants who cross-complained, and for how much money.
In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980).
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Master might be able to play... is so peripheral that the underly-
ing complexities will necessarily remain.' '279
If a complex and lengthy case is deemed neither to be within
the scope of equity nor to be such that the fifth amendment due
process requirements preclude the right to a jury trial, policy con-
siderations could be used by a court to deny a jury trial demand.
Although the Federal Rules assist the jury in most cases, these
rules can be somewhat ineffective in complex litigation. Thus, the
possibility of an irrational verdict remains. The procedure guaran-
teed by the seventh amendment should only apply when the jury
is capable of rendering a rational verdict.
VI. GUIDELINES FOR DENYING A TRIAL BY JURY
There is support for the contention that the only practical way
to determine systematically whether a jury trial is appropriate in
a particular case is to exclude designated classes of actions, such
as all antitrust or patent litigation.2s0 This approach, however,
could undoubtedly preclude jury trials in some cases in which the
jury would adequately resolve the dispute.28 1 A preferable ap-
proach, designed to preserve the seventh amendment right, is a
case-by-case analysis, which would give the district court judge
discretion to determine whether a jury or court trial would be ap-
propriate in complex cases. Fears of abuse of judicial discretion
should be allayed because the Supreme Court has demonstrated a
strong presumption in favor of jury trials.28 2 It has also been noted
that trial judges overwhelmingly support preservation of the civil
jury.
283
In determining whether a jury is capable of comprehending
the issues in a case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Lit-
igation284 proposed a three-factor test.285 The Third Circuit's test
279. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also
Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHi. L. REV. 386, 388
nn.2, 3 (1954).
280. E.g., Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 226 (N.D.
Ill. 1977).
281. Compare Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (six to eight week trial)
with In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (four to
six month trial and 900,000 marked documents). Both cases involved securities
fraud.
282. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1890). Further, any ob-
jections to the case-by-case approach, due to the wide discretion it affords judges to
decide jury trial motions, should be quelled by the fact that the Supreme Court has
declared that complicated facts alone do not preclude a jury trial. United States v.
Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472-73 (1906). See text accompanying notes
87-89 supr.
283. Kalven, 'Ihe Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1072-74 (1964).
284. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
285. Id at 1088.
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addresses the degree of complexity necessary for a district court
judge to deny a jury trial by considering
[fjirst, the overall size of the suit, the primary indicia of
which are the estimated length of trial, the amount of evi-
dence to be introduced and the number of issues that will
require individual consideration; second, the conceptual
difficulties in the legal issues and the factual predicates to
these issues, which are likely to be reflected in the amount
of expert testimony to be submitted and the probable
length and detail of jury instructions; and third, the diffi-
culty of segregating distinct aspects of the case, as in-
dicated by the number of separately disputed issues
related to single transactions or items of proof.
2 86
In addition to the Third Circuit's test, the following chart in-
dicates when various federal courts have granted or denied jury
trials. As can be seen, some types of cases are particularly sus-
ceptible to a non-jury determination under Ross.2 87 For example,
antitrust cases, securities violations, patent infringement cases,
and trade secret thefts should alert the district court judge to a
potential jury trial problem. In these types of cases, a weighing of
the complexity of the issues, the anticipated length of the case,
and the number of documents to be submitted must be con-
sidered. The chart reflects a preference for a trial before the court
if the case is expected to last three months or more and if 2,000
documents are anticipated. Even if the issues to be litigated do
not involve antitrust or other traditionally complex issues, the
potential length of the trial, the number of documents, and the
number of parties involved should be considered when the appro-
priateness of trial by jury is addressed. These factors hinder the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries";288 moreover, "a court
is fully organized and competent for the transaction of business
without a jury.
28 9
286. Id at 1088-89.
287. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970); see notes 208-29 and accompanying
text supra.
288. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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290. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
291. One hundred thousand pages is equivalent to a forty foot high stack, or a three-story
building, or 90 volumes of the Federal Reporter 2d series, including headnotes. In re
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev 'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).
292. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nor. Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
293. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
294. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
295. 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1967).
296. Total trial time was thirty-two days, but due to recesses the trial actually encom-
passed three months. Id. at 752.
297. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
298. Reflecting nine years of discovery, many of these documents were submitted in
Japanese and had to be translated into English. Id. at 1073.
299. 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954). This case involved condemnation proceedings concern-
ing 236 tracts of land. The case was remanded due to the trial judge's abuse of discre-
tion in allowing one jury to hear the entire case. Id. at 157. On remand, a jury trial
was permitted, but the case was split so that separate juries would hear different por-
tions of the case. Id. at 157-58. Although a pre-Ross case, the Gwathmey court
recognized the practical limitations and abilities of jurors in effectively dealing with
the case. Id. at 153-56.
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LENGTH NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS
4-6 months 900,000 documents of discovery"9'
2 years 5,000,000 documents; 100,000 pages of
testimony anticipated
4 months 1,050 contracts in evidence; 2,500 pages of
accounting work sheets; 1,200 trial exhibits
5 months 2,300 exhibits; 19,000 pages of transcripts
3 months '  4,000 pages of testimony; 200 exhibits
1 year 20,000,000 documents; 100,000 pages of
depositions
2 98
7 weeks"°  6,248 page record in 12 volumes3"'
14 months 46,802 pages of trial transcripts
6-8 weeks 0 ' 306
1 year 309
300. This reflects only the time within which evidence was heard on the issue of the value
of the land. Id. at 152.
301. The record, likewise, reflects testimony only on value. Id.
302. 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
303. 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
304. Although the court stated that "[tihere appears to be little doubt that this is a com-
plex litigation," id. at 605, the court found the case not to be beyond the practical
abilities and limitations of juries. Id at 606.
305. This time period reflects estimated trial time on the issue of liability and, as the court
noted, this was not an unusually long period of time for securities fraud litigation. Id
306. While the opinion does not reflect the exact number of documents, the court re-
marked that "hundreds of documents had been marked for trial." Id at 605. How-
ever, the court distinguished Boise Cascade, where the sheer volume of documents
precluded the right to trial by jury. Id at 606.
307. 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
308. The court noted that infringement on the pantyhose patent "involved no abstract
scientific theories, no intricate mechanical devices, [and] no complex chemical com-
pounds." Id. at 342.
309. This year represented the time between the filing of the complaint and the motion to
strike the jury. Id. at 337.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The seventh amendment must be reevaluated in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the litigation process in complex, lengthy
cases. Unless the Supreme Court is willing to define precisely
whether trial by jury is a right that exists in such cases, the
United States district courts and courts of appeals will be permit-
ted to continue their disparate treatment of this issue. In response
to this problem, there are two potential tacks the Supreme Court
could take in holding that the seventh amendment right to trial by
jury does not extend to cases that involve complex legal issues
and are expected to last months or more.
First, the Supreme Court could find that these cases are not
within the scope of the seventh amendment. Because the right to
trial by jury exists only in actions at law, a classification of com-
plex, lengthy cases as equitable would foreclose the seventh
amendment right. This can be accomplished by looking to the
historical functions of juries and of equity courts. In addition,
equity courts assume jurisdiction of a case when the legal remedy
is inadequate. An adequate remedy at law cannot be rendered in a
trial before a jury when the jury is incapable of understanding the
issues and evidence presented. In 1970, the Supreme Court, in
Ross v. Bernhard,310 established a viable test to ascertain whether
the seventh amendment should apply in a given case. The Court
noted that the practical abilities and limitations of juries should
be considered before a jury trial can be allowed. Although Ross at-
tempted to establish the boundaries of the seventh amendment
right, it failed to enunciate manageable standards for its applica-
tion. As a result, the Ross test has not been universally adopted
by federal courts.
Further, in order to meet the common law definition of a jury,
the venire must be composed of individuals who represent a fair
cross section of the community. If a case is particularly complex
and is anticipated to be extremely lengthy, many jurors could be
excused due to personal hardship. A violation of the fair cross sec-
tion rule could occur in this situation, because those excluded due
to hardship are most often highly educated professionals or indi-
viduals with demanding business or personal pursuits. Conse-
quently, a jury trial in a lengthy, complex case may violate the
seventh amendment's requirement for the composition of a jury.
The Supreme Court could take a second tack if it finds the
seventh amendment right does extend to complex, lengthy cases.
The Court could find that the fifth amendment's due process
requirements are fundamental and must override the competing
seventh amendment concerns. Due process requires that a litigant
310. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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be given a fair trial before a fair tribunal. A fair trial cannot be had
when a jury is neither capable of applying the law to the facts nor
of understanding the evidence or the issues. There can be no fair
tribunal when an arbitrary verdict is rendered by a jury faced with
confusing and incomprehensible numbers of documents and expert
witnesses. A trial by jury would, in this situation, enhance the risk
of erroneous decisions and would therefore violate due process.
Finally, policy considerations mandate a non-jury trial in ex-
tremely complex, lengthy cases. A judge has more familiarity with
and control over the trial than the jury and will less likely be faced
with the psychological burden of reaching a verdict in a forum in
which issues hard to understand are presented and procedures
beyond the jury's control are practiced.
In light of these legal and policy considerations, an attempt
has been made to formulate factors a district court judge should
utilize in deciding whether a case is sufficiently complex so that a
jury will be incapable of rational decision making. The Supreme
Court, with reasonable certainty, can establish such factors and
guidelines for use by the district court judges should it decide
that the right to jury trial does not extend to complex, lengthy
cases or that, in such cases, the mandates of the fifth amendment
override any seventh amendment right.
Deidre W. Bastian Lee
Eugenia Cooper Wootton
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